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ABSTRACT 
Projections of expenditures for old age pensions, survivor pensions, and disability 
pensions were made for the period 1985-2050 on the basis of future developments 
in the population structure by age, sex, and marital status. Four demographic 
scenarios were formulated: (i) a Benchmark scenario, with demographic rates kept 
constant at their 1980-84 level; (ii) a Fertility scenario, with a rise of the Total 
Fertility Rate (TFR) towards replacement level; (iii) a Mortality scenario, with 
reductions in mortality rates of 30 percent for females, and 45 percent for males; 
(iv) a Western scenario, which combines extreme demographic conditions of several 
West European countries: a TFR of 1.28, proportions never-marrying of one-third, 
one-third of marriages ending in divorce, and male and female life expectancies of 
74 and 81 years, respectively. 
The current pension system was combined with all four scenarios. Also, the impact 
of high female labor force participation, and a rise in the average age at retirement 
were investigated. The results indicate that changes in demographic conditions 
cannot prevent increases in and funding problems for pension expenditures in Italy. 
An increase in fertility has no effect on the pension system until 2030, when a larger 
generation will enter the labor force. Longer active periods for males and females 
will cause increases in pension expenditures in the future and are not long term 
solutions of the pension problem. Postponement of retirement age would help to 
balance the pension funds, but depends on the economic situation and on the labor 
market. 
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1. General Characteristics of the Demographic Situation in Italy 
Over the last 20 years, the demographic shape of Italy has changed rapidly. In 1961 
there was a total population of 50,624,000 inhabitants, of whom 25,840,000 were 
female. Until that time the average annual rate of increase had been more or less 
stable for the previous 100 years, at around 6-8 per 1000 inhabitants. The natural 
increase was 9 per 1000, the result of a birth rate of 18 per 1000 and a mortality 
rate of 9 per 1000, but it was compensated to some extent by emigration. 
With the baby boom in the 1960s, the fertility rate rose to 2.7; the maximum 
number of births was reached in 1964 with 1,016,000 live births. In the 1970s, 
however, there were some radical changes: fertility decreased steadily, while the 
death rate fell sharply, especially among infants, and emigration came to a halt. As 
a consequence, the population growth rate went down, so that in 1981 the total 
population was 56,577,000, the result of a growth rate of only 4.4 per 1000 
inhabitants throughout the ten previous years. During the 1980s this trend has 
become even more pronounced (see Figure 1 and Table 1): in 1985 the overall 
fertility rate was 1.6 children per adult woman (1.3 as estimated in 1988), while in 
1987 female life expectancy was 79.2 years and male life expectancy 72.6 years. 
The presence of immigration, especially from North Africa, is starting to become 
a stable feature of the demographic landscape, although it is still a minor factor. 
The overall population growth rate is rapidly approaching zero. The aging process 
of the population has therefore accelerated, and is starting to give cause for 
concern. 
Years 
Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate, 1950-1985. 
Table 1. Summary indicators of the demographic situation. 
*The values refer to a period of 2 or 3 years around each indicated year. 
Life Expectancy* 
Males 
at birth 
at age 60 
at age 80 
Females 
at birth 
at age 60 
at age 80 
Total Fertility Rate 
Proportion extramarital births 
Crude Marriage Rate (per 1000) 
Mean age at first marriage 
Males 
Females 
63.7 67.2 69.0 70.6 72.0 
16.0 16.7 16.7 17.0 17.4 
5.0 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.2 
67.2 72.3 74.9 77.2 78.6 
17.5 19.3 20.2 21.1 21.9 
5.5 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.5 
2.6 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.4 
3.4 2.4 2.2 4.3 5.4 
7.7 7.6 7.4 5.7 5.2 
28.8 28.6 27.5 27.2 27.1 
25.0 24.8 24.1 24.1 24.0 
Since the fertility rate is the crucial factor governing future developments, it is 
important to understand its social context. Almost all births in Italy are marital: 
extramarital births, although they are increasing, still amount to no more than 5% 
of the total (Figure 2). The marriage rate is higher than in other developed 
countries; the average age at marriage shows little sign of increase; and the divorce 
rate is still negligible, in spite of the fact that the law allowing divorce has now been 
in force for almost 20 years. Given this general picture, which is so unlike the 
situation in most other developed countries, the extremely low fertility rate can only 
partly be explained by changing values--although these have changed, especially in 
urban areas and among the higher social classes. It must also be the result of a 
short-term economic situation in which there are few job opportunities for young 
people and living accommodation is both expensive and hard to come by, so that 
the normal passage to a full adult life with all its responsibilities is obstructed, since 
children are slower to leave the family home, whether this be for reasons of 
marriage or cohabitation. This helps to explain the apparent disparity between the 
stability of the family structure and the drop in the fertility rate. 
In the following section we shall analyze the Italian demographic situation in greater 
detail, comparing it, when possible, with that of the other countries adhering to this 
project. 
Years 
Figure 2. Proportion of extramarital births. 
2. Structures by Sex, Age and Marital Status and the Main Demographic 
Patterns 
The population of Italy has aged considerably over the last 25 years (see Section 3, 
Table 4a): between 1961 and 1985 the proportion of children (0-14 years) shrank 
considerably, leading to the contraction of the base of the age pyramid. The young- 
age groups (15-25 years) have become slightly larger more recently (due to the 
baby-boom generation), but the other central age groups have not undergone any 
consistent modifications. Significant increases have taken place in the population of 
the higher age groups, especially in the female component: the proportion of 
old-age population (60+) has risen from 14% in 1961 to 19% in 1985 (see Table 
4a), and the ratio of males to females has fallen from 96% to 95% in the same 
period. 
The aging of the population is a phenomenon which took place in the demographic 
evolution of the other countries of Europe. But Italy differs considerably from the 
other countries in its structure by marital status. 
In a description of the changes in the population structure by marital status between 
the years 1960 and 1980 in the countries covered by this study, Gonnot and 
Vukovich (1989) identified the following factors: 
1) a reduction in the proportion of married people, and an increase in the 
proportion of divorcees; 
2) an increase in the proportion of widows and a fall in that of widowers; 
3) an increasing proportion of single men. 
Figures for Italy deviate considerably from these findings. The proportion of single 
men and women (Table 2), which was extremely high in 1961 (34% and 29% 
respectively) fell somewhat in the decades which followed, dropping to 31% for men 
and 25% for women in 1981. 
Table 2. Marital composition of the population aged 15 and over for each sex, 
1961-1985. 
Status 
Single 
Married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Total 
1961 
Males Females 
34.4 29.1 
62.1 58.1 
3.5 12.8 
0.0 0.0 
100.0 100.0 
1971 
Males Females 
32.3 26.1 
64.2 60.5 
3.4 13.4 
0.1 0.1 
100.0 100.0 
1985 
Males Females 
31.3 24.6 
65.3 60.5 
3.2 14.4 
0.3 0.4 
100.0 100.0 
The discrepancy between Italy and other Western nations is even greater when 
figures for divorce are concerned. The comparatively recent introduction of divorce 
laws is responsible for the negligible divorce rate up until 1971, while the essential 
stability of the institution of marriage helps to explain the very limited rise in the 
number of divorces since then. The proportion divorced is 0.3% for men and 0.4% 
for women, so Italy lags well behind other countries in Western Europe, where the 
proportion is 4.5% and 5.9% respectively. 
In contrast with other Western European countries, a higher proportion of older 
Italians get divorced: in the rest of Europe most divorces take place in the 35-49 
age group, with a high incidence also in the 25-29 age group. In Italy, on the other 
hand, divorces most frequently involve people between 45 and 60 years, i.e. when 
women have reached the end of their childbearing years. 
Widowhood affects a much greater number of women than men: the proportion of 
widowers fell from 3.5% in 1961 to 3.2% in 1985, while in that same period the 
proportion of widows rose from 12.8% to 14.4% (Table 2). In 1985, there were 2.8 
newly-widowed women for every newly-widowed man. 
Table 3. Elderly population by sex, age group and marital status, 1961-1985. 
Status 
MALES 
Single 6.7 7.1 11.2 9.7 6.8 6.1 
Married 78.4 56.3 76.3 56.0 82.2 63.4 
Widowed 14.9 36.6 12.4 34.3 10.7 30.3 
Divorced 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
FEMALES 
Single 13.3 11.9 16.2 15.2 12.3 13.2 
Married 43.0 18.6 43.7 18.2 45.2 19.3 
Widowed 43.7 69.5 40.1 66.6 42.2 67.4 
Divorced 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1961 1971 
65-74 65-74 
1985 
75+ 75+ 65-74 75+ 
Marital status among the elderly varies greatly depending on age group (65-74, or 
75 and over) and sex (Table 3). Most elderly males are married: in 1985, 63% of 
the men over 75 were married, compared with 30% who were widowers. 42% of the 
women aged 65-74 are widows, and this proportion rises sharply, reaching 67% for 
those over 75. Figures show, in fact, that most Italian women over 75 find 
themselves alone: if we add 13% of the spinsters and 0.1% of the divorcees to the 
67% of the widows, we find that 81% of the Italian women of that age are without 
a partner. 
3. Population Forecast by Sex, Age and Marital Status 
3.1. Four Different Scenarios 
Turning now to the input data of the demographic forecast, we should first point 
out that as Italy only compiles breakdowns of the population by marital status in 
census years, and not annually, it has been presumed that the picture of marital 
status registered in the 1981 census remained constant until 1985. This has allowed 
us to bring the beginning of our forecast into line with those for other countries. For 
age-sex-marital status specific rates of mortality, birth, marriage, divorce and 
widowhood, figures for 1981 were used on the assumption that they remained 
constant in the period from 1981 to 1985. 
In accordance with the forecasts made by the other countries, we used 4 scenarios, 
all of which excluded the possibility of external migration: 
1. Benchmark Scenario. All variables are kept constant, e.g. the population is 
projected by maintaining the values observed in 1981 for fertility (TFR 1.56), 
mortality (life expectancy at birth: females 78.1 and males 71.3 years) and the rates 
for marriage, divorce and widowhood constant. 
2. Fertility Scenario. Assumes fertility to increase to replacement level by the year 
2005, which, in Italy's case, means an increase of 0.5 children per woman over the 
next 20 years. 
3. Mortality Scenario. Age-specific mortality rates are reduced by 30% for women 
and 45% for men, the other demographic components remaining constant. This is 
equivalent to an increase in life expectancy of 8-10 years for men and 4-5 years for 
women. 
4. Western Scenario. A combination of the "extreme" demographic rates observed 
in Western Europe: West German fertility, Swiss mortality, and Swedish nuptiality 
and divorce rates. This means, in the case of Italy, that the average number of 
children per woman falls from 1.56 to 1.28, to match the rate in Germany; mortality 
becomes equal to that of Switzerland (a life expectancy of 74 years for men and 81 
for women); the model of nuptiality and divorce conforms to that of Sweden (one 
in three persons does not marry, the average age at first marriage is 28 for women 
and 30 for men, one in three marriages end in divorce). 
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Table 4a. Population by broad age-groups, 1951-2050. 
Year 
1951 12422 29320 5774 47516 26.1 61.7 12.2 100.0 
1961 12405 31172 7047 50624 24.5 61.6 13.9 100.0 
1971 13234 31878 9025 54137 24.4 58.9 16.7 100.0 
1981 12132 34561 9864 56557 21.5 61.1 17.4 100.0 
1985 11026 35506 10607 57139 19.3 62.1 18.6 100.0 
Benchmark Scenario 
2000 9912 35017 12702 57631 17.2 60.8 22.0 100.0 
2015 8037 33302 13382 54721 14.7 60.9 24.5 100.0 
2030 7048 27887 15103 50038 14.1 55.7 30.2 100.0 
2050 5553 22876 12894 41323 13.4 55.4 31.2 100.0 
Fertility Scenario 
2000 10772 35017 12702 58491 18.4 59.9 21.7 100.0 
2015 10659 34153 13382 58194 18.3 58.7 23.0 100.0 
2030 10770 31327 15103 57200 18.8 54.8 26.4 100.0 
2050 10592 31386 12894 54872 19.3 57.2 23.5 100.0 
Mortality Scenario 
2000 9930 35114 13311 58355 17.0 60.2 22.8 100.0 
2015 8086 33668 15995 57749 14.0 58.3 27.7 100.0 
2030 7113 28346 18936 54395 13.1 52.1 34.8 100.0 
2050 5628 23379 17317 46324 12.1 50.5 37.4 100.0 
European Scenario 
2000 9489 35060 13013 57562 16.5 60.9 22.6 100.0 
2015 6758 33041 14541 54340 12.4 60.8 26.8 100.0 
2030 5457 26378 16699 48534 11.2 54.4 34.4 100.0 
2050 3730 19222 14659 37611 9.9 51.1 39.0 100.0 
Relative (%) Absolute (1000s) 
Total 0-14 0-14 15-59 60+ 15-59 Total 60+ 
All the changes in trends take place gradually over a period of 20 years (1985-2005): 
Gomot (1990) has found that the results are fairly robust, regardless of differences 
in the choice of transition period.' 
In order to analyze the results of the projections, we have drawn up some tables 
summarizing the results, so that the various scenario outcomes can be compared. 
The following indicators were used (Tables 4a through 4d): a) population by large 
groups of ages; b) YADR, the young-age dependency ratio (0-14/15-64), and 
OADR, the old-age dependency ratio (65+/15-64); c) the structure of the elderly 
population (60+) by marital status and sex; and d) the ratio of the sexes in the 
elderly population. 
Table 4b. Dependency ratios, 1985-2050. 
Scenario 1 1985 1 2000 1 2015 1 2030 1 2050 
Under 15 
Benchmark 28.5 25.9 22.0 22.1 21.6 
Fertility 28.1 28.5 30.5 31.0 
Mortality 25.8 21.8 21.8 21.3 
Western 24.7 18.6 17.9 16.9 
60 and over 
Benchmark 19.0 24.5 27.6 34.7 39.3 
Fertility 24.5 27.0 31.4 29.5 
Mortality 25.9 33.8 45.0 54.3 
Western 25.3 30.7 41.2 53.3 
Total 
Benchmark 47.5 50.4 49.5 56.8 60.9 
Fertility 52.7 55.4 61.8 60.5 
Mortality 51.7 55.6 66.8 75.7 
Western 50.0 49.3 59.1 70.1 
'It should be noted that, for reasons of simplicity, the same proportional change for all the age- 
specific rates has been applied, which, in effect, means that the level of the curve either moves upwards 
or downwards. To a certain extent, this seems to be an over-simplification, given the marked changes 
which have been taking place in the age-structure of the rates in more recent years. On the other hand, 
it keeps the number of components under consideration low. Therefore it makes discussion and 
international comparison much easier. 
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Table 4c. Marital composition of the population aged 60 and over, 1985-2050 (%). 
Table 4d. Masculinity ratio for the population aged 60 and over. 
Year 
Year 
1985 12.4 41.9 0.3 45.4 100.0 
Females 
Scenario 
Benchmark 1 Fertility I Mortality I European 
6.8 79.4 0.3 135 100.0 
Males 
1985 72.2 72.2 72.2 72.2 
2000 72.6 72.6 75.0 72.9 
2015 72.9 72.9 82.7 73.8 
2030 75.4 75.4 88.7 76.5 
2050 73.9 73.9 91.4 75.1 
Single Mamed Single Widowed Mamed Divorced 
Benchmark Scenario 
Total Divorced Widowed 
2000 10.3 415 0.9 47.3 100.0 
20lS 7.8 41.4 1.4 49.4 100.0 
2030 8.3 42.0 1.6 48.0 100.0 
2050 8.9 36.0 1.6 52.9 100.0 
Fertility 
U]OO 10.3 415 0.9 47.3 100.0 
2015 7.8 41.4 1.4 49.4 100.0 
2030 8.4 42.0 1.6 48.1 100.0 
2050 9.1 36.4 1.6 52.9 100.0 
Total 
7.6 n.o 0.7 14.7 100.0 
7.9 75.3 0.9 lS.8 100.0 
11.3 n.8 0.9 15.0 100.0 
14.0 68.1 0.9 17.0 100.0 
Scenario 
7.6 n.o 0.7 14.7 100.0 
7.9 75.4 0.9 lS.8 100.0 
11.3 72.9 0.9 15.0 100.0 
13.7 68.6 0.9 16.9 100.0 
Mortality Scenario 
U]OO 10.3 43.6 0.9 45.2 100.0 
2015 8.0 49.0 1.4 41.6 100.0 
2030 8.3 51.2 1.6 38.9 100.0 
2050 8.8 46.2 1.6 43.4 100.0 
European 
2000 10.4 42.0 1.1 46.6 100.0 
2015 8.2 41.3 4.0 46.6 100.0 
2030 10.0 38.1 9.6 42.2 100.0 
2050 20.7 27.8 11.7 39.8 100.0 
75 77.2 0.7 145 100.0 
7.8 75.0 0.9 16.3 100.0 
10.7 71.3 0.9 17.1 100.0 
13.4 64.8 0.8 21.0 100.0 
Scenario 
7.6 76.8 1.2 14.4 100.0 
8.2 71.6 5.0 15.1 100.0 
15.2 61.1 10.0 13.7 100.0 
31.3 45.4 95  13.7 100.0 
33. Changes in the Size and Age Structure of the Population 
BENCHMARK SCENARIO 
The total population will increase until the year 2000: until then, the increase of the 
elderly population will be enough to compensate for the marked drop in the young 
population, and the less pronounced decrease in the 15-59 age group. Between the 
year 2000 and the year 2030 the total population will diminish, because the young 
and adult age groups will diminish faster than the rate at which the elderly age 
group increases. Between 2030 and 2050 the total population will fall much more 
markedly, because all three population groups will shrink. The decline of the elderly 
age group is caused by the fact that the increasingly small generations born in the 
baby-bust period (from 1965 onwards) will start reaching the age of 60. 
As a result of the developments in the three broad age groups, the young-age 
dependency ratio diminishes rapidly after 1985, and the old-age ratio increases. In 
1985, the former was about 10% higher than the latter; by the year 2000 the two 
rates differ by less than 1%, after which the OADR becomes increasingly higher 
than the YADR. The total dependency rate will therefore increase, rising from 48% 
to 61%, but with alterations in its composition: in 1985, 60% of it was young-age 
dependency, whereas 65% of the rate for 2050 is old-age dependency. 
The percentage of the population constituted by the elderly will increase from 19% 
in 1985 to 31% in 2050, and the process of aging will naturally be more accentuated 
for women: the sex ratio for the elderly population is always heavily balanced in 
favor of women, and the ratio of men to women will stay at about 72-75 to 100 until 
the year 2050. Variations in the male-female ratio are due to the aging of the 
baby-boom generations, causing the old-age group to undergo relative rejuvenation, 
and causing a slight increase in the ratio of males to females. The passage of the 
generations of the baby bust has the opposite effect. 
FERTILITY SCENARIO 
Under the assumption of mid-term replacement-level fertility, there would be a 
smaller decrease in the population, which would reach 54.872 million in 2050, as 
there would be much smaller decreases in the number of young people and in the 
number of adults compared with those observed in the Benchmark Scenario. In 
particular, the young-age group, while decreasing in absolute terms, would only 
decrease as a percentage until the year 2015, after which it would increase again, 
returning in 2050 to the 1985 value (19%). The young-age dependency ratio, after 
undergoing a slight decrease, would thus rise again to the 1985 level, with further 
increases in the next decades. The expected halt in the aging of the population 
would, however, take longer to appear than the recovery of fertility: the old-age 
dependency ratio would continue to rise until the year 2030, and only with the 
arrival at advanced years of the small baby-bust generations would the proportion 
start to decrease (from 31% to 30%). But even then, it would be substantially 
higher than current rates. The population aged over 15 would increase up until the 
year 2000, and then decrease due to the exit from reproductive age of the larger 
generations born in the 1960s, as would happen if present trends were to continue. 
However, the reduction would be less pronounced over the next decades due to the 
coming into being of the new large generations born following the increase in 
fertility. 
MORTALITY SCENARIO 
The Mortality Scenario would lead to a smaller decrease in the total population, 
which would reach 46,324 million in the year 2050, due mainly to a greater increase 
in the elderly population, and a notable aging of the population. 
What is immediately striking, compared with the Benchmark Scenario (see Figure 
3), is the increase in the old-age dependency ratio, which would soar from 19% to 
54% between 1985 and 2050: in 2050 there would be over 50 elderly persons for 
every 100 persons in the active population. 
The period of greatest aging would be represented by the 15 consecutive years 
between 2015 and 2030, when the larger generations born in the 1960s would leave 
the ranks of the active population: indeed, the proportion of the population aged 
15-59 falls by six percentage points to 529'0, while that of the elderly population 
increases by seven points, and the trend becomes more pronounced over the next 
20 years. 
I I I I 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Years 
BM + FER 0 M3R A EURO 
Figure 3. Old-Age Dependency Ratio. 
WESTERN SCENARIO 
Of the various hypotheses put forward, the one concerning changes in the marital 
model seems the least adaptable to the Italian case: while present levels of fertility 
and mortality are not significantly different from the respective values in West 
Germany and Switzerland, the nuptiality and divorce profiles in Italy are very 
different from those found in other countries (especially Sweden), as we have 
already pointed out. Indeed, it is not expected that there will be such a great fall 
in nuptiality in ~ t a l ~ . ~  
The projection of the Italian population conducted under this scenario is, therefore, 
essentially of value as an interesting exercise aimed at evaluating the possible 
impact of a revolution in marital behavior on the aging and structure by marital 
status of the population. The results of the forecast show a dramatic fall in the total 
population, which would reach 37.611 million in 2050, compared to 41.323 million 
in the Benchmark Scenario. This would be due to the greater decrease in the 
number of young people (which would fall to 3.730 million in 2050, compared to 
5.553 million in the Benchmark Scenario) and the greater decrease in the number 
of adults (which would fall to 19.222 million, compared to 22.876 in the Benchmark 
Scenario). These decreases could not be sufficiently compensated by the greater 
increase in the number of elderly people. There would be a notable aging of the 
population: the YADR would fall from 29% in 1985 to 17% in 2050, while the 
OADR would rise from 19% to 53%. 
3.3. Changes in the Marital Composition of the Elderly 
BENCHMARK SCENARIO 
In 1985, 42% of the female population of over 60 years and 79% of the male 
population of the same age were married, 45% and 14% respectively were widowed, 
0.3% were divorced, and 12% and 7% were single. Assuming that the other 
conditions of the demographic pattern remain constant over time, the changes which 
can be observed in the structure by marital status are merely the consequence of 
the effect of the structure by age and the gradual aging of the population, and not 
of any changes in the tendency to marry or divorce. 
Aging for women leads essentially to reduction in the proportion (as well as the 
number) of single women (from 12% to 9%) and a steady increase in the share of 
widows (from 45% to 53%), while the percentage of married women increases to 
42% in the year 2030 and then falls to 37% in 2050. 
q h e  present decline in marriages is attributed more to the present difficult economic situation 
than to a real change in customs, given that extra-marital cohabitation remains a rare phenomenon, 
and the most recent data on divorce rates reveal values which are still too low to enable us to predict 
such an accentuated destabilization of Italian family structures. 
For men, too, there are increases in the percentage of widowers (from 14% to 17%) 
and in the percentage of single men (from 7% to 14%). The differences in the 
results between the two sexes is due to the state of the marriage market following 
the numerical imbalances between male and female generations born in the years 
of the baby bust: women benefit from the decrease in fertility as, due to the age 
difference between spouses (3-4 years), they can choose their partner from among 
a greater number of men. 
The profile over time of the structure by marital status of the elderly population is 
also affected by the different level of aging caused by the arrival at the age of 60 
of generations of different sizes. The final picture is that of an old-age group, over 
half of which consists of women (58%) married or widowed, and the rest of which 
consists of men who are mainly married. There is a decrease over time of the 
married whose overall share falls from 58% to 50%, with a corresponding increase 
in the proportion of non-married (divorcees, single and widowed persons) among 
whom widows prevail. 
FERTILITY SCENARIO 
This scenario assumes an increase in fertility to replacement level by the year 2005. 
Since neither the amount nor structure of the population aged 60 and over during 
the next 60 years will be affected by an increase in fertility, the marital status 
distribution of elderly people is identical to that of the Benchmark Scenario (Table 
4c). 
MORTALITY SCENARIO 
The most interesting results from this scenario concern the variations which would 
take place in the structure by marital status, especially between men and women. 
In contrast to the Benchmark Scenario, the most significant variations would take 
place in the structure of the elderly population, while the composition of the 
population aged 15-60 would remain relatively unchanged. Due to the reduced 
sex-gap in mortality, the percentage of married women over 60 years would 
increase, while there would, on the other hand, be a considerable reduction in the 
percentage of widows, compared to the hypothesis of constant rates (see Figure 4c). 
In the Benchmark Scenario the percentage of widows increased from 45% in 1985 
to 53% in 2050, but in this scenario it would fall to 43%, while the percentage of 
married women would increase from 42% to 46%, compared with a decrease from 
42% to 37% in the Benchmark Scenario. There would be a parallel fall in the 
percentage of married men, and a greater increase in the number of widowers than 
if the rates were to remain constant. In the last analysis, it would be women, above 
all, who would benefit from the reduction in the male mortality rates in terms of 
their living arrangements: the number of women doomed to long years of 
widowhood would drop sharply. Finally, it appears that in this scenario, as in the 
previous ones, the proportion of divorcees would remain small, whatever the age 
group considered. 
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Figure 4. a)  Percent single among the elderly. b) Percent married among the 
elderly. c) Percent widowed among the elderly. d) Percent divorced among the 
elderly. Males and females. 
WESTERN SCENARIO 
The main feature of this scenario is that the fall in nuptiality would lead to a 
decrease in the incidence of widowhood: the percentage of women who were 
widows from the age of 60 onwards would fall from 45% in 1985 to 40% in 2050, 
compared to the increase which would otherwise take place if the rates were to 
remain constant, and the percentage of widowers would remain almost unaltered. 
Nonetheless, the living arrangements of the elderly would still be just as difficult: 
instead of a high number of widowed persons, there would be a very high number 
of single elderly persons. Society would have to take complete responsibility for 
their material and psychological support, especially as single persons lack the 
comfort and support that married persons may derive from their children's families. 
In contrast to the previous scenarios, there is a marked, steady increase in the 
population of divorcees, due to the hypothesis of an increase in the divorce rate to 
match the level in Sweden, at least until the reduction of married persons causes 
a parallel fall in the number of people getting divorced. Nevertheless, the 
proportion of divorcees in Italy would still remain below lo%, even in 2050 (see 
Figure 4d). 
4. The Labor Force and Activity Rates 
When studying the impact of demographic changes on social security spending, the 
role played by shifts in the working-age population and their effects on the 
"contributing sector" is of key importance. 
The overall labor force participation rate has remained steady at about 40% for the 
past 20 years. Looking at the situation in more detail, however, and breaking down 
the figures by sex and age, significant changes in the structure of the labor force can 
be discerned during the period from 1960 to the present. 
Male labor force participation rates dropped from 81% in 1960 to 67% in 1984, 
falling steadily throughout the period except for a brief upward turn at the end of 
the 1970s (see Figure 5). The biggest drops were registered in the 14-19 and 60+ 
age groups. With school students staying longer in full-time education and an earlier 
retiring age pattern, the average length of time spent in employment was 
considerably reduced. 
Even greater changes have been registered among the female population. The 
number of women in the labor market fell rapidly as Italy's economic boom took 
off, the country became more highly industrialized and the population became more 
urban. In the early 1970s, however, women between the ages of 25 and 35 began to 
make some headway in the labor market. The percentage of younger women in 
employment fell slightly from the mid-1960s until the beginning of the 1970s, only 
to pick up substantially during the 1980s, reaching 60% for the 20-25 age group, 
59% for the 25-29 age group, and 56% for the 30-34 age group. 
The overall picture of female employment has changed little, however, with 32% 
of the women in the labor force in 1960 and 34% in 1984. In line with the male 
population, far fewer females at the top and bottom ends of the age scale now 
work: 45% of 14-19 year olds worked in 1960 compared to 27% in 1984, while labor 
participation in the 65+ age group fell from 11% to 2% in the same period. 
Nevertheless, the growing participation of women between the ages of 20 and 50 in 
the labor market must certainly lead us to expect a higher female employment rate 
for the future. 
The shape of the age-specific curve for female labor force participation rates has 
also changed considerably (Figure 5). This curve is gradually losing the classic 
"double camel-hump" shape caused by the withdrawal of women from active 
employment due to family commitments, and has come to resemble the male curve 
a little more. 
Further light can be shed on changes in female working patterns by breaking down 
employment rates according to marital status. Single women have traditionally 
occupied a fairly large section of the labor market, but employment rates of around 
50% among married women are a recent phenomenon affecting even greater 
numbers of women in age groups between 20 and 45, generally considered to be the 
years when family commitments take up most time. 
age group 
Figure 5. Labor force participation, males and females. 
5. The Italian Pension System 
The Italian pension system is very complex and finely structured as it is regulated 
by many laws which have followed one another over the course of time to regulate 
a wide range of different insurance schemes. In order to provide a general frame 
of reference, we should first identify the main groups of activities and the specific 
norms for each group: 
a) employees (FPLD) (excluding those of categories C and D); 
b) self-employed workers (farmers, artisans, tradesmen); 
c) civil and military state employees; 
d) local administration employees; 
e) those over 60; 
f )  the disabled. 
The management of pensions for old age, seniority of service, disabled, survivors, 
etc., takes place according to different schemes for each group. The schemes differ 
in relation to: 
- definition of the requisites for the right to the pension; 
- methods of calculating the pension itself; 
- criteria governing the way in which the State supplements the pension to bring 
it up to the minimum; 
- possible adjustments to the present pension being drawn. 
The different characteristics of the various insurance schemes are summarized in 
Tables 5-7. Together, the schemes mentioned are responsible for over 90% of the 
pension expenditures paid out today in this country (see Table 5). (There are, 
indeed, other categories protected by private funds, such as journalists, doctors, 
lawyers etc.) 
Table 5. Pension rules for different population groups. 
It should be noted that insurance payments are calculated in terms of the pensions 
taken out in Italy in 1988 in a particular fund, rather than on the basis of the 
number of persons who benefit from them. As is the case in many other countries 
participating in this study, this is because the Italian pension laws governing the 
right to a pension concern each individual pension policy, regardless of whether the 
person who is entitled to this right has other pensions. As a result, there is a 
substantial difference between the number of pensions and the number of 
pensioners, and we do not yet have adequate statistics to calculate the ratio between 
these two quantities and furnish indications on the possible shape it might take. 
Group protected El 
Private employees 
(FpLD) 
Self-employed 
worker 
State Employees 
Local administration 
employees 
Old-age pensions 
How calculated 
2% 
years of contr. 
avg. salary last 
5 years 
Usually the 
minimum 
(LIT 300,000) 
Last month's 
wage 
Last month's 
wage 
How 
financed 
ca. 25% of 
salary 
F i e d  amount 
+ variable % 
of income 
variable % 
of wage 
variable % 
of wage 
Minimum 
age 
Years of 
contributions 
M 
60 
65 
65 
a/ 
65 
Min. 
15 
15 
15 
151 
20 
F 
55 
60 
65 
601 
65 
Max. 
40 
40 
40 
40 
We may note (Table 6) that the fund for private employees (FPLD) accounts for 
about 60% of the entire bulk of pensions taken out in 1988, which amounts to about 
16 million in total. The remaining 40% was distributed among the self-employed 
(20%), public employees (11%), the social fund (5%), and the disabled (5%). If, 
however, we separate the pensions by type (old age or seniority of service, disability, 
survivorship), we may note that among the pensions paid just to the self-employed 
there are more disability pensions than pensions for old age or length of service, 
and that public employees receive more survivors' pensions than the self-employed, 
although the numerical superiority of the pensions distributed by the FPLD remains 
unchallenged. 
Table 6. Characteristics of different Italian pension schemes, 1988. 
If, on the other hand, we consider the average pension amount, the classification of 
the various funds is completely different: the average FPLD pension is worth LIT 
9.4 million, while a state pension is worth 18 million, and a pension from CPDEL, 
the main fund for local administration employees, is worth 14.8 million; it is worth 
the least for self-employed workers and the social fund. The same is true of indirect 
pensions. In effect, state and local administration employees are entitled to a 
pension worth about double that of those covered by the FPLD fund, even though 
there are 5 times as many of the latter, so they receive a much greater share of the 
total contributions paid than might be expected given their small numbers. Even 
the ratio of pensions to contributors varies considerably from fund to fund (Table 
7): it ranges from 820 per 1000 for private sector employees to 636 for 
self-employed workers and, among public employees, from 590 for state employees 
to 364 for CPDEL contributors. As far as the total amount of contributions is 
concerned we should finally mention the role played by those paid by the State, 
which contributes substantially, if not totally, to insurance payments (above all to 
the FPLD, the funds for the self-employed and the social funds) though this 
payment is very much dependent on legislative provisions which are renewed every 
year and, therefore, difficult to predict. 
Table 7. Ratio pensions per insured. 
The observations so far made suggest that the notable diversity in terms of numbers 
and norms which characterizes the payment of contributions and the drawing of 
pensions among the various insurance schemes makes it essential to keep the 
characteristics of the various funds distinct from each other. This is necessary if one 
wishes to proceed with the forecasting of pension expenditures in Italy. And this, 
indeed, is the path followed in the many forecasts undertaken in this field by 
scholars, economists and actuaries. This would, however, require additional data and 
calculations that are far beyond the focus of this study. 
FUND 
FPLD 
Self-Employed 
Civil Servants: State 
CPDEL 
Moreover, the calculation of the number of pensioners using a scheme-specific 
approach must involve estimates of the proportion of who is insured in that 
particular fund, out of the total active population and the ratio of pensioners to 
insurees. While the first proportion can easily be measured for the first year of the 
projection, it is extremely difficult to predict, given the large extent to which it 
depends on legislation (such as that which led to a doubling of CPDEL pensions in 
20 years and, as such, has little to do with demographic evolution!). Moreover, the 
ratio pensioners/insurees is difficult to extrapolate for the same reason, and it 
should not be forgotten that a barrier is posed by the fact that there are no statistics 
for the number of pensioners, only for the number of pensions which have been 
taken out, which also makes it difficult to calculate the present number. 
Ratio (* 1000) 
820 
636 
590 
364 
We should, therefore, concentrate on the main objective of this work, which was to 
evaluate, in an international comparative framework, the impact of demographic 
transformations, either underway or derived from reasonable scenarios, on the 
evolution of the measured pension burdens in demographic terms--transformations 
resulting from the impact of generations of gradually changing dimensions on the 
labor market (the contributing force) and on the system of those "eligible for a 
pension" (the absorbing force). If we limit ourselves to this, then the model is of 
notable innovative significance, considering the hitherto scant attention which has 
been paid by models of a mainly actuarial character to the possible or probable 
variations in the population structure, which is surely the principle input data of any 
model regarding social insurance. 
This is why we have conducted an exercise in projecting the amount of pension 
expenditures, based on a single ("average") scheme, hypothetically valid at a national 
level, the initial data for which was obtained by taking the average of the real 
typical values for each fund: it is clear, given the extremely broad distribution of 
these values, how difficult it is to attribute any meaning related to a situation which 
might be realized to values for pension expenditures obtained in this manner. We 
cannot assume that any situation whatsoever, however close it might be to the 
present reality, can last in time, given the profound transformation of the labor 
market which is presently underway, increasingly inclined towards the intensification 
of activity in the services sector, which can only create further imbalances in the 
already delicate sector of social insurance. 
We shall therefore give the following results a theoretical value: evaluating the 
possible impact of demographic trends on the pension system, under simplified 
hypotheses concerning the functioning of this system. 
6. The Future of the Pension System 
6.1. Total Pension Expenditures and Pension Claims 
The aging of population--widely discussed above--will have a strong impact on the 
pension system. It is quite obvious that the overall number of retirees will increase, 
whichever demographic scenario is adopted: a rough estimation of this figure3 
(Gonnot 1990) shows that the percentage increase of the number of claimants 
between the years 1985 and 2030 will range from 67% in the Benchmark Scenario 
hypothesis to 108% under the Mortality Scenario assumptions (Table 8). 
Table 8. Percentage increase in number of retirees (% relative to 1985). 
4This is calculated assuming the maximum cohort labor force participation rate between age 25 and 
60 as an indicator for the proportion of people claiming a pension. 
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Under simplified hypotheses, such as the use of a unique insurance scheme, the 
contribution rate and yearly benefits rate remain constant (Gonnot 1990), the total 
amount of pension expenditures varies year by year according to the estimated 
demographic trends. 
Regardless of the scenario described, we can expect an increase in expenditure, 
which will already be considerable in the first period covered by the projection. 
Between 1985 and 2000 real spending on pensions would rise by 18% in the 
Benchmark Scenario (see Table 9). Compared with 1985, increased expenditure in 
the following projection periods is even higher. A drop, however, can be observed 
for the period 2030-2050 when, as has been underlined on a number of occasions, 
a similar trend will occur in aging. It is envisaged that almost all of the annual 
average rates of expenditure growth would become negative. 
Over 85% of expenditure will be devoted to old-age pensions: expenditures for the 
survivors' pensions will not exceed LIT 25 billion in the Benchmark Scenario, and 
they will grow at practically the same rate as old-age pensions (Table 10). 
Table 10. Pension expenditures by type, 1985-2050. 
Tables 9 and 10 do not include results for the Fertility Scenario as this scenario 
does not lead to significant changes with respect to the Benchmark Scenario, a 
result which was anyway expected, given the minimal effects that we know an 
increase in fertility would have on demographic aging. 
Type 
Old Age 
Survivors 
Total 
Old Age 
Survivors 
Total 
Old Age 
Survivors 
Total 
1985 2000 20 15 2030 2050 
Benchmark 
85.4 85.2 85.4 86.3 85.1 
14.6 14.8 14.6 13.7 14.9 
100 100 100 100 100 
Mortality 
85.4 86.0 88.1 89.2 88.2 
14.6 14.0 11.9 10.8 11.8 
100 100 100 100 100 
Western 
85.4 85.5 86.3 88.1 88.8 
14.6 14.5 13.7 11.9 11.2 
100 100 100 100 100 
The Mortality Scenario, on the other hand, would have marked consequences: a 
reduction of mortality, while slowing down the growth of expenditure on the 
survivors at least initially, would lead to expenditure on old-age pensions up to 85% 
higher than that paid in 1985. 
A reduction in fertility would have less effect, as expenditure on old-age pensions 
would increase by 60% between 1985 and 2030, while the growth of overall 
expenditure would be in the long run compensated by a reduction in expenditure 
on the bereaved. This would be due to changes in the structure of the population 
by marital status caused by Italian couples adapting their marital behavior to match 
European standards. 
6.2. The Increase and Decrease of the Labor Force 
Assuming that specific activity rates remain constant over time, the labor force, too, 
depends on the variations of demographic aggregates: it increases from 1985 to the 
year 2000, after which it drops steadily. The amount varies, however, according to 
the scenarios adopted (Table 11). In the Benchmark Scenario the maximum, in the 
year 2000, is 23.863 million actives, and the minimum, in 2050, is 15.571 million. In 
the Fertility Scenario, the increase in fertility, which takes place between 1985 and 
2005, starts having some effect in 2015, and this becomes more pronounced in the 
following years: the 2050 minimum is 20.955 million. If there were an increase in 
survival (Mortality Scenario assumption), the size of the labor force would be 
slightly greater than in the Benchmark Scenario (the 2050 minimum is 16.257). 
Table 11. Total labor force, 1985 and index 2000-2050. 
According to the Western Scenario, on the other hand, the labor force would 
amount to 24.198 million units in the year 2000, then undergo an even sharper drop 
than in the other scenarios, with 14.179 million in 2050, as the increase in divorces 
Scenario 
Benchmark 
Fertility 
Mortality 
Western 
BM 65 
BM GDR 
Absolute 
(in thousands) 
1985 
22,98 1 
Index (1985 = 100) 
2000 
104 
104 
104 
105 
113 
141 
2030 
83 
92 
86 
84 
94 
116 
2015 
97 
98 
99 
101 
107 
134 
2050 
68 
9 1 
71 
62 
76 
94 
and the drop in marriages would only compensate for the drop in fertility in the 
initial years as the fertility rates gradually changed. 
6.3. Ratio of Contributions to Benefits 
As a consequence of a smaller number of contributors, the revenue of the system 
will be reduced as well, if the tax rate remains unchanged. With average income 
and pension claims held constant, the total contributions would cover a decreasing 
proportion of the pension expenditures (Table 12). In the case of the Benchmark 
Scenario the ratio contributions/benefits would pass from 79% in 1985 to 44% in 
2050. 
Table 12. Ratio (total contribution/total benefits) and balancing measures. 
Ratio (total contribution/total benefits) 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
BM 
FER 
MOR 
WEST 
BM65 
BMGDR 
0.79 0.70 0.61 0.46 0.44 
0.79 0.70 0.62 0.5 1 0.59 
0.79 0.68 0.53 0.39 0.35 
0.79 0.70 0.59 0.43 0.36 
0.79 1.01 0.85 0.66 0.58 
0.79 0.79 0.69 0.54 0.52 
Cuts in Benefits, 1985-2050 (% difference relative to 1985) 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
BM 
FER 
MOR 
WEST 
BM65 
BMGDR 
- -11.4 -22.8 -41.8 -44.3 
- -11.4 -21.5 -35.4 -25.3 
- -13.9 -32.9 -50.6 -55.7 
- -11.4 -25.3 -45.6 -54.4 
- 27.8 7.6 -16.5 -26.6 
- 0.0 -12.7 -31.6 -34.2 
Balanced contribution rate, 1985-2050 (contribution rate in 1985: 24.2%) 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
BM 
FER 
MOR 
WEST 
BM65 
BMGDR 
30.6 34.6 39.7 52.6 55.0 
30.6 34.6 39.0 47.5 41.0 
30.6 35.6 45.7 62.1 69.2 
30.6 34.6 41.0 56.3 67.3 
30.6 24.0 28.5 36.7 41.7 
30.6 30.6 35.1 44.8 46.6 
Different demographic evolutions will speed up or slow down this trend: in the 
Mortality or Western scenario hypotheses the ratio will be about 40% already in 
2030 and it will further decrease over the following 20 years, while an increase in 
fertility is able to make the ratio stay over 50% up until the end of the projection. 
The ratio contributions/benefits could be interpreted as an indicator of the financial 
deficit of the system. In an over-simplified situation, where the system could be 
completely financially balanced, the maintaining of the ratio at the 1985 level could 
be obtained by either increasing the contribution rate or reducing the level of paid 
pensions. 
In the first hypothesis, the tax rate would already have to be more than 30% in 1985 
compared to the present level of 24%. In the following years the burden on the 
contributors is expected to increase quickly (Table 12), especially if the 
demographic conditions will lead to fast aging: assuming the Mortality Scenario the 
contribution rate would have to be around the unpracticable level of 70%. 
If, as an alternative, only the pensions were adjusted to cover the deficit of the 
system, cuts of as much as 50% would already be necessary in 2030 (see Table 12). 
Only an increase in labor force due to the rise in fertility could ensure that cuts in 
benefits were limited over the following decades (25% in 2050). 
7. The Impact of Selected Policy Measures 
Previous discussion shows that the aging of population is expected to cause a great 
deal of problems for the social security system. Figures for the future, although 
sometimes exaggerated because of the over-simplified hypotheses of the adopted 
model, indicate that if the present trends--declining fertility, mortality and 
nuptiality--continued, the balancing of the system would require hard economic 
sacrifice on the part of either the contributors or the retirees. 
In this section we discuss some simple policy measures which may be taken to cope 
with the problem of demographic aging and avoid an excessive increase of the 
contribution rate or a severe benefits reduction. 
The Benchmark-65 Scenario assumes that age at retirement is progressively raised 
to 65 years by the year 2005 for both males and females and that no survivor 
pensions are served under the age of 60. It means, for Italy, that each professional 
category will have the same retirement age norms as the State employees (see 
Table 5). This is exactly the object of a bill that parliamentarians are discussing in 
these months in order to solve at least the first "emergency" for the social security 
system. The GDR Scenario, on the other hand, acts on the contributing sector. It 
proposes that by the year 2005 both males and females would follow the pattern of 
labor force participation observed in 1985 in the Germany Democratic Republic, 
which is characterized by a high participation of women and no difference according 
to marital status. In our country this would lead to an overall female activity rate 
of more than 50% compared to the 33% in 1985. Each of these so called 
"economic" scenarios assume constant demographic conditions. 
The two economic scenarios would have a very strong impact (see Table 11). If the 
retirement age rose to 65 years, the labor force would certainly increase (maximum 
26.020 million, minimum, in 2050, 17.569), but it would naturally increase even 
more if the rates of activity increased to match the GDR rates: in this case there 
would be 32.496 million actives in the year 2000, and the 2050 minimum would be 
21.641. This is therefore the scenario which yields the highest values for the 
contributing population. However, the advantages of a larger labor force are offset 
by the subsequent increase in the number of pension claimants that in 2030 will 
pass from 12.323 million in the Benchmark Scenario to 15.725 in the GDR 
Scenario. 
Much more favorable will be the effect of the "65" Scenario in reducing and keeping 
low the number of retirees relative to the labor force: the ratio between the amount 
of retirees and population in the labor force is steadily lower than any of the other 
scenarios (see Figure 6). 
n a .  I 
year 
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Figure 6. Old-age retireesllabor force. 
Raising the retirement age to 65 years seems to be the best solution as far the 
financial balancing of the system is concerned (see Table 12). First of all, the ratio 
contributions/benefits would be very high at least until the year 2015 (1.01 in 2000 
and 85%) and the crisis of the system could be delayed after the end of the 
projection period, and in 2050 the contributions would still cover about 60% of the 
total pension expenditures. 
The positive effect of this measure is more evident if we look at the amount of 
"sacrifices" required in order to balance the system. No cuts in benefits would be 
required if we moved the retirement age to 65 years for both males and females: 
indeed, up until 2015 we could expect an increase in average pensions and in the 
long run we would have to reduce this amount by "only" 27%. The adjustment of 
the labor force (GDR Scenario) could also be helpful in maintaining pensions at 
a higher level than that generated by any of the demographic evolution hypotheses. 
At least in the short and medium period, the sharp and immediate increase of the 
labor force ensured by the GDR hypothesis would have a better effect on the 
system compared to that of a rejuvenation of the whole system due to an increase 
in fertility. 
The balancing contribution rate would remain relatively low (less than 30%) until 
2015 as the delayed retirement age pattern ("65" Scenario) would limit the burden 
on the contributing sector. In 2050 it would rise to 42%, a value in any case lower 
than those generated by the demographic scenarios. Only fertility would ensure a 
similar tax rate level (41%), but in the short and medium term the positive effect 
of this demographic measure is insignificant, and an "injection" of labor force such 
as the one provided by GDR Scenario could have a stronger impact. 
8. Conclusion 
The dynamic projection of the Italian population by marital status leads to the 
conclusion that, whichever scenario of possible evolution in demographic behavior, 
the aging process will not come to a halt, at least not by the year 2050. The wide 
range of possible assumptions proposed in this study contains the set of hypotheses 
usually made in Italy when dealing with the future of population. The main purpose 
of this exercise being the evaluation of the burden of old people on the active 
population, the results confirm that either a further reduction of mortality or a 
further decrease in fertility together with a slighter increase in life expectancy would 
have a strong impact on population aging. Even in the case of fertility increasing to 
replacement level the old-age dependency ratio will continue to increase until the 
year 2030. 
The overall consequence of demographic changes on the performance of the state 
pension system looks dramatic. Assuming a hypothetical wholly financially balanced 
system, the total contributions paid by the labor force will cover a decreasing 
proportion of required pension expenditures. In order to balance the pension funds, 
assuming constant working and retirement behavior, it would be necessary in 2030 
to decrease average benefits by about 40% (a minimum of 35% in the case of 
increased fertility and a maximum of 51% in the case of decreased mortality); 
otherwise, the balancing contribution rate would amount to more than 50% of the 
gross salary (range 48%-62%). 
To counteract the implications of population aging, different policy measures could 
be proposed. In the present simulation, the effect of two possible actions are 
estimated, the former aimed at increasing labor force participation rates (especially 
for women), the latter consisting in a delayed retirement age pattern. 
A higher level of activity would have a beneficial, although limited, effect in the 
short and medium term, but in the long run it leads to a disturbing increase in 
entitlements. It seems to suggest that, in the long term, the "natural injection" of 
labor force ensured by the overall rejuvenation of the contributing part of the 
system (Fertility Scenario) would have a better impact than a forced activity rate 
increase. 
Under constant demographic conditions, the raising of the retirement age to 65 
years for both males and females seems by far the most efficient solution in 
avoiding (or, at least, delaying) the social security system crisis. This is the 
hypothesis which better warrants the planned programs of the Italian Government 
aimed at limiting demographic pressure on the system. In fact, in these months a 
bill concerning an increase in the minimum retirement age is being discussed in the 
Parliament. 
Of course, it is a combination of social and economic measures which would 
probably need to reflect the complexity of the Italian social security system that 
would give the best solution, but the results so far discussed provide further proof 
that, from a strictly demographic point of view, the upward shift of the retirement 
age pattern is one of the most convenient measures for balancing the system. 
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